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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2012

Security Protocol Verification: Symbolic and Computational Models

Bruno Blanchet

Résumé

Security protocol verification has been a very active research area since the 1990s. This paper surveys various approaches in this area, considering the verification in the symbolic model, as well as the more recent approaches that rely on the computational model or that verify protocol implementations rather than specifications. Additionally, we briefly describe our symbolic security protocol verifier ProVerif and situate it among these approaches.
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Dates et versions

hal-00863388 , version 1 (18-09-2013)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-00863388 , version 1

Citer

Bruno Blanchet. Security Protocol Verification: Symbolic and Computational Models. First Conference on Principles of Security and Trust (POST'12), 2012, Tallinn, Estonia. pp.3--29. ⟨hal-00863388⟩

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