Security Analysis of Pseudo-Random Number Generators with Input: /dev/random is not Robust

Yevgeniy Dodis (1) , David Pointcheval (2, 3, 4) , Sylvain Ruhault (2, 3, 4) , Damien Vergnaud (2, 3, 4) , Daniel Wichs (5)

1 CIMS - Courant Institute of Mathematical Sciences [New York]
2 CASCADE - Construction and Analysis of Systems for Confidentiality and Authenticity of Data and Entities
3 LIENS - Laboratoire d'informatique de l'école normale supérieure
4 ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris
5 CSS - College of Computer and Information Science [Boston]

A pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) is a deterministic algorithm that produces numbers whose distribution is indistinguishable from uniform. A formal security model for PRNGs with input was proposed in 2005 by Barak and Halevi (BH). This model involves an internal state that is refreshed with a (potentially biased) external random source, and a cryptographic function that outputs random numbers from the continually internal state. In this work we extend the BH model to also include a new security property capturing how it should accumulate the entropy of the input data into the internal state after state compromise. This property states that a good PRNG should be able to eventually recover from compromise even if the entropy is injected into the system at a very slow pace, and expresses the real-life expected behavior of existing PRNG designs. Unfortunately, we show that neither the model nor the specific PRNG construction proposed by Barak and Halevi meet this new property, despite meeting a weaker robustness notion introduced by BH. From a practical side, we also give a precise assessment of the security of the two Linux PRNGs, /dev/random and /dev/urandom. In particular, we show several attacks proving that these PRNGs are not robust according to our definition, and do not accumulate entropy properly. These attacks are due to the vulnerabilities of the entropy estimator and the internal mixing function of the Linux PRNGs. These attacks against the Linux PRNG show that it does not satisfy the "robustness" notion of security, but it remains unclear if these attacks lead to actual exploitable vulnerabilities in practice. Finally, we propose a simple and very efficient PRNG construction that is provably robust in our new and stronger adversarial model. We present benchmarks between this construction and the Linux PRNG that show that this contruction is on average more efficient when recovering from a compromised internal state and when generating cryptographic keys. We therefore recommend to use this construction whenever a PRNG with input is used for cryptography.

Domaines: Informatique [cs]

Yevgeniy Dodis, David Pointcheval, Sylvain Ruhault, Damien Vergnaud, Daniel Wichs. Security Analysis of Pseudo-Random Number Generators with Input: /dev/random is not Robust. ACM CCS 2013 - 20th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Nov 2013, Berlin, Germany. ⟨10.1145/2508859.2516653⟩. ⟨hal-00864431⟩