Security Analysis of PRINCE

Jérémy Jean (1) , Ivica Nikolic (2) , Thomas Peyrin (2) , Lei Wang (2) , Shuang Wu (2)

1 CASCADE - Construction and Analysis of Systems for Confidentiality and Authenticity of Data and Entities
2 NTU - Nanayang Technological University

In this article, we provide the first third-party security analysis of the PRINCE lightweight block cipher, and the underlying PRINCE_core. First, while no claim was made by the authors regarding related-key attacks, we show that one can attack the full cipher with only a single pair of related keys, and then reuse the same idea to derive an attack in the single-key model for the full PRINCE_core for several instances of the α parameter (yet not the one randomly chosen by the designers). We also show how to exploit the structural linear relations that exist for PRINCE in order to obtain a key recovery attack that slightly breaks the security claims for the full cipher. We analyze the application of integral attacks to get the best known key-recovery attack on a reduced version of the PRINCE cipher. Finally, we provide time-memory-data tradeoffs, that require only known plaintext-ciphertext data, and that can be applied to full PRINCE.

Domaines: Cryptographie et sécurité [cs.CR]

Jérémy Jean, Ivica Nikolic, Thomas Peyrin, Lei Wang, Shuang Wu. Security Analysis of PRINCE. FSE 2013, Mar 2013, Singapore, Singapore. ⟨hal-00870448⟩