BeleniosRF: A Non-interactive Receipt-Free Electronic Voting Scheme

Pyrros Chaidos (1) , Véronique Cortier (2) , Georg Fuchsbauer (3, 4) , David Galindo (5)

1 UCL - University College of London [London]
2 PESTO - Proof techniques for security protocols
3 CASCADE - Construction and Analysis of Systems for Confidentiality and Authenticity of Data and Entities
4 DI-ENS - Département d'informatique - ENS Paris
5 University of Birmingham [Birmingham]

We propose a new voting scheme, BeleniosRF, that offers both receipt-freeness and end-to-end verifiability. It is receipt-free in a strong sense, meaning that even dishonest voters cannot prove how they voted. We provide a game-based definition of receipt-freeness for voting protocols with non-interactive ballot casting, which we name strong receipt-freeness (sRF). To our knowledge, sRF is the first game-based definition of receipt-freeness in the literature, and it has the merit of being particularly concise and simple. Built upon the Helios protocol, BeleniosRF inherits its simplicity and does not require any anti-coercion strategy from the voters. We implement BeleniosRF and show its feasibility on a number of platforms, including desktop computers and smartphones.

Domaines: Cryptographie et sécurité [cs.CR]

Pyrros Chaidos, Véronique Cortier, Georg Fuchsbauer, David Galindo. BeleniosRF: A Non-interactive Receipt-Free Electronic Voting Scheme. 23rd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS'16), Oct 2016, Vienna, Austria. ⟨10.1145/2976749.2978337⟩. ⟨hal-01377917⟩