Recovering short secret keys of RLCE encryption scheme in polynomial time

Alain Couvreur (1, 2) , Matthieu Lequesne (3) , Jean-Pierre Tillich (3)

1 LIX - Laboratoire d'informatique de l'École polytechnique [Palaiseau]
2 GRACE - Geometry, arithmetic, algorithms, codes and encryption
3 SECRET - Security, Cryptology and Transmissions

We present a key recovery attack against Y. Wang's Random Linear Code Encryption (RLCE) scheme recently submitted to the NIST call for post-quantum cryptography. This attack recovers the secret key for all the short key parameters proposed by the author.

Mots clés: McEliece encryption scheme; RLCE; Key recovery attack; Schur product of codes; Code-based Cryptography; Generalised Reed Solomon codes

Domaines: Théorie de l'information [cs.IT]; Cryptographie et sécurité [cs.CR]

Alain Couvreur, Matthieu Lequesne, Jean-Pierre Tillich. Recovering short secret keys of RLCE encryption scheme in polynomial time. PQCrypto 2019 - International Conference on Post-Quantum Cryptography, May 2019, Chongqing, China. pp.133--152, ⟨10.1007/978-3-030-25510-7_8⟩. ⟨hal-01959617⟩