Normalized equilibrium in Tullock rent seeking game

Eitan Altman (1, 2, 3, 4) , Mandar Datar (1, 4) , Gérard Burnside (5) , Corinne Touati (6)

1 NEO - Network Engineering and Operations
2 LINCS - Laboratory of Information, Network and Communication Sciences
3 COMUE UCA - COMUE Université Côte d'Azur (2015-2019)
4 AU - Avignon Université
5 Alcatel-Lucent Bell Labs France [Nozay]
6 Inria Grenoble - Rhône-Alpes

Games with Common Coupled Constraints represent manyreal life situations. In these games, if one player fails tosatisfy its constraints common to other players, then theother players are also penalised. Therefore these games canbe viewed as being cooperative in goals related to meetingthe common constraints, and non cooperative in terms ofthe utilities. We study in this paper the Tullock rent seekinggame with additional common coupled constraints. We havesucceded in showing that the utilities satisfy the property ofdiagonal strict concavity (DSC), which can be viewed asan extention of concavity to a game setting. It not onlyguarantees the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium but also of the normalized equilibrium.

Domaines: Informatique et théorie des jeux [cs.GT]

Eitan Altman, Mandar Datar, Gérard Burnside, Corinne Touati. Normalized equilibrium in Tullock rent seeking game. GameNets 2019 - Game Theory for Networks, Apr 2019, Paris, France. pp.109-116, ⟨10.1007/978-3-030-16989-3_8⟩. ⟨hal-02291549⟩