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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2020

Recovering cryptographic keys from partial information, by example

Résumé

Side-channel attacks targeting cryptography may leak only partial or indirect information about the secret keys. There are a variety of techniques in the literature for recovering secret keys from partial information. In this tutorial, we survey several of the main families of partial key recovery algorithms for RSA, (EC)DSA, and (elliptic curve) Diffie-Hellman, the public-key cryptosystems in common use today. We categorize the known techniques by the structure of the information that is learned by the attacker, and give simplified examples for each technique to illustrate the underlying ideas.
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Dates et versions

hal-03045663 , version 1 (08-12-2020)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-03045663 , version 1

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Gabrielle de Micheli, Nadia Heninger. Recovering cryptographic keys from partial information, by example. 2020. ⟨hal-03045663⟩
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