The Effects of Social Ties on Coordination: Conceptual Foundations for an Empirical Analysis

Giuseppe Attanasi (1) , Astrid Hopfensitz (2) , Emiliano Lorini (3, 4) , Frédéric Moisan (3, 5)

1 BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée
2 TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics
3 IRIT-LILaC - Logique, Interaction, Langue et Calcul
4 CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
5 UT3 - Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier

This paper investigates the influence that social ties can have on behavior. After defining the concept of social ties that we consider, we introduce an original model of social ties. The impact of such ties on social preferences is studied in a coordination game with outside option. We provide a detailed game theoretical analysis of this game while considering various types of players, i.e., self-interest maximizing, inequity averse, and fair agents. In addition to these approaches that require strategic reasoning in order to reach some equilibrium, we also present an alternative hypothesis that relies on the concept of team reasoning. After having discussed the differences between the latter and our model of social ties, we show how an experiment can be designed so as to discriminate among the models presented in the paper.

Mots clés: Team Reasoning; Social Preferences; Forward Induction; Game Theory; Coordination; Social Ties

Domaines: Intelligence artificielle [cs.AI]; Apprentissage [cs.LG]; Logique en informatique [cs.LO]; Informatique et langage [cs.CL]

Giuseppe Attanasi, Astrid Hopfensitz, Emiliano Lorini, Frédéric Moisan. The Effects of Social Ties on Coordination: Conceptual Foundations for an Empirical Analysis. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2014, 13 (1), pp.47-73. ⟨10.1007/s11097-013-9320-4⟩. ⟨hal-01123762⟩