Effectivity functions and efficient coalitions in Boolean games

Elise Bonzon (1) , Marie-Christine Lagasquie-Schiex (2) , Jérôme Lang (3)

1 LIPADE - EA 2517 - Laboratoire d'Informatique Paris Descartes
2 IRIT-ADRIA - Argumentation, Décision, Raisonnement, Incertitude et Apprentissage
3 LAMSADE - Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision

Boolean games are a logical setting for representing strategic games in asuccinct way, taking advantage of the expressive power and conciseness of propositionallogic. A Boolean game consists of a set of players, each of which controls a setof propositional variables and has a specific goal expressed by a propositional formula.We show here that Boolean games are a very simple setting, yet sophisticated enough,for analysing the formation of coalitions. Due to the fact that players have dichotomouspreferences, the following notion emerges naturally: a coalition in a Boolean game isefficient if it has the power to guarantee that all goals of the members of the coalitionare satisfied. We study the properties of efficient coalitions.

Mots clés: Game theory; Propositional logic; Coalitions

Domaines: Informatique [cs]

Elise Bonzon, Marie-Christine Lagasquie-Schiex, Jérôme Lang. Effectivity functions and efficient coalitions in Boolean games. Synthese, 2012, 187 (73-103), ⟨10.1007/s11229-012-0130-y⟩. ⟨hal-01509974⟩