Finding the weakest link(s): Coalition games for decentralized discrete-event control
Résumé
In decentralized discrete-event system (DES) architectures,
agents fuse their local decisions to arrive at the
global decision. The contribution of each agent to the final
decision is never assessed; however, it may be the case that
only a subset of agents, i.e., a (static) coalition, perpetually
contribute towards the correct final decisions. In casting the
decentralized DES control (with and without communication)
problem as a cooperative game, it is possible to quantify the
average contribution that each agent makes towards synthesizing
the overall correct control strategy. Specifically, we explore
allocations that assess contributions of non-communicating and
communicating controllers for this class of problems. This
allows a quantification of the contribution that each agent
makes to the coalition with respect to decisions made solely
based on its partial observations and decisions made based on
messages sent to another agent(s) to facilitate a correct control
decision.
Domaines
Génie logiciel [cs.SE]
Origine : Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
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